The talk will be delivered by Prof. Srinivas Arigapudi, IIT Kanpur
18 March, 2024, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) at IIM Bangalore will host a research seminar on, ‘Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination’, to be led by Prof. Srinivas Arigapudi, IIT Kanpur (Economics area), at 4 pm on 28th March 2024, at Classroom P-21.
Abstract: Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, characterized by frequent miscoordination among players. The researchers investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the actions of a random sample of their opponents. First, they show that when all agents have the same sample size, whether it is small or large, their behavior converges to one of the pure coordinated equilibria. In contrast, the main results show that stable miscoordination often persists when some agents make decisions based on small samples while others rely on large samples. Specifically, in many environments, increasing the sample size for some agents (but not all) results in stable states marked by miscoordination. Finally, the researchers demonstrate the empirical relevance of their results in a bargaining application.
Speaker Profile: Dr. Srinivas Arigapudi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economic Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur. His main area of research is Evolutionary Game Theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents.
Webpage Link: https://sites.google.com/view/srinivasarigapudi/home
The talk will be delivered by Prof. Srinivas Arigapudi, IIT Kanpur
18 March, 2024, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) at IIM Bangalore will host a research seminar on, ‘Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination’, to be led by Prof. Srinivas Arigapudi, IIT Kanpur (Economics area), at 4 pm on 28th March 2024, at Classroom P-21.
Abstract: Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, characterized by frequent miscoordination among players. The researchers investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the actions of a random sample of their opponents. First, they show that when all agents have the same sample size, whether it is small or large, their behavior converges to one of the pure coordinated equilibria. In contrast, the main results show that stable miscoordination often persists when some agents make decisions based on small samples while others rely on large samples. Specifically, in many environments, increasing the sample size for some agents (but not all) results in stable states marked by miscoordination. Finally, the researchers demonstrate the empirical relevance of their results in a bargaining application.
Speaker Profile: Dr. Srinivas Arigapudi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economic Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur. His main area of research is Evolutionary Game Theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents.
Webpage Link: https://sites.google.com/view/srinivasarigapudi/home